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Abstract 22 
We have learned much about tool use in non-humans since the first discovery of 23 
Oldowan stone tools. Despite the ongoing debate over whether tool use in other animals 24 
requires cultural transmission, it seems clear that today humans show a quantitative, if 25 
not qualitative, difference in our ability to transmit information socially through cultural 26 
transmission. This ability makes cumulative culture possible. Comparative studies 27 
provide relevant insights, however to address the when, where, and ultimately why this 28 
shift to high-fidelity social learning occurred we must look to the Paleolithic 29 
archaeological record. Yet here the de facto assumption that even the earliest stone tools 30 
serve as evidence of high-fidelity cultural transmission hinders investigation more than it 31 
helps. Here, we pragmatically suggest "resetting" the null hypothesis for the processes 32 
underlying early stone tool production. The null hypothesis we prefer is that Earlier Stone 33 
Age tools might have been so-called latent solutions rather than cultural material that  34 
derived from – and depended upon – modern human-like high-fidelity cultural 35 
transmission. This simple shift in perspective prioritizes the systematic investigation of 36 
more parsimonious potential explanations and forces us to demonstrate rather than 37 
presume that stone tools could not have existed without high-fidelity cultural 38 
transmission.   39 
 40 
The archaeological record clearly shows that by at least 2.6 million years ago (Ma; and 41 
likely much earlier, e.g., McPherron et al. 2009; Harmand et al. 2015), one or more fossil 42 
hominin taxa were frequently making and using stone tools (Semaw et al. 1997). A 43 
defining (and puzzling) feature of early stone tool assemblages is that patterns of 44 
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production appear to have little identifiable or directional changes over hundreds of 45 
thousands of years. Over the last decade, archaeologists have come to rely more heavily 46 
on findings from cognitive science to identify the mechanisms responsible for this pattern 47 
in the early archaeological record (Morgan et al. 2015; Lycett and Gowlett 2008). For 48 
example, some (Morgan et al. 2015; Putt et al. 2014) argue that various forms of teaching 49 
(in some cases mediated by language) prevented substantial temporal changes in early 50 
stone tool assemblages. Such studies tend to start from a seemingly unquestioned a priori 51 
assumption that artifacts in the earliest archaeological record are products of culturally 52 
transmitted information – or mental templates – concerning how to make a stone tool (but 53 
see: Richerson and Boyd 2005; Corbey et al. 2016; Hovers 2012; Tennie et al. 2016). In 54 
short, researchers interested in what the archaeological record can tell us about cognition 55 
commonly ascribe modern human cognitive skills like shared intentionality, conformity, 56 
overimitation, and teaching (skills that many have argued are key to the sophisticated 57 
way that modern humans, but not other living primates, transmit information socially) to 58 
Pliocene and Early Pleistocene hominins. 59 
 60 
It is not surprising that archaeologists see signs of modern human cognition in Earlier 61 
Stone Age tools given that the technology appears at once so impressive and so foreign. 62 
If hive-making were culturally transmitted among bees today (it is not), then one could 63 
excuse a hapless “modern bee-man” visitor of a future museum of “prehistoric bee-facts” 64 
for making a similar inference about the cognitive abilit ies of her Early Pleistocene 65 
ancestors from the impressively (but superficially) ordered and complex nature of her 66 
lineage’s presumed “culture material” (Figure 1). Despite the complexity of beehives 67 
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there is no evidence that the structure of these forms reflects anything other than low 68 
fidelity social transmission at most. 69 
 70 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 71 
 72 
Our attempt at humor aside, clearly hominins were making and using Earlier Stone Age 73 
tools. For us, however, a null hypothesis that this technology was passed from hominin 74 
brain to brain and from generation to generation via cultural transmission in a way 75 
reminiscent of, if not exactly like, that used by humans today is not clearly supported by 76 
the archaeological evidence. Here, we suggest “resetting” the null hypothesis for stone 77 
tool production (e.g. Corbey et al. 2016; Tennie et al. 2016), if for no other reason than to 78 
make room for simpler explanations to be systematically investigated, and perhaps 79 
rejected, before we reach a hypothesis that invokes modern high-fidelity social learning 80 
mechanisms (i.e. cultural transmission) in hominin species living more than a million 81 
years ago. The null hypothesis we prefer is that Earlier Stone Age tools might have been 82 
so-called latent solutions rather than cultural material (Tennie et al. 2016). 83 
 84 
Our concern is that current explanations that view the earliest stone tools as necessarily 85 
cultural products likely over-interpret the underlying cognitive mechanisms. This view on 86 
the archaeological record comes in part from research on tool-use by living great apes 87 
(i.e. the phylogenetically most appropriate comparison group) where similar difficulties 88 
are faced. For instance, when the available evidence is analyzed, an argument can be 89 
made that high fidelity cultural transmission is not necessarily responsible for many great 90 
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ape tool “cultures” (Tennie et al. 2009). Instead population-wide behaviors currently 91 
described as cultural are largely the result of individual learning, loosely connected by 92 
low-fidelity social learning, such as stimulus enhancement. Tennie and colleagues (2009) 93 
describe this as “latent solutions,” and they are distinct from modern human phenomena 94 
expressed as fully cumulative culture and requiring high-fidelity transmission 95 
mechanisms.  96 
 97 
Latent solutions are behaviors that an individual can generate largely through individual 98 
learning, leavened in some cases with low-fidelity social learning. The behavior is 99 
“latently” present in the individual and expressed when in the context of the right stimuli 100 
or when one recognizes the behavior (or: its effects on the environment) expressed by 101 
others. Unlike culturally transmitted behaviors, latent solutions themselves are not 102 
transmitted from individual to individual by cultural means. Whereas cultural 103 
transmission allows for the accumulation of modifications through time—the so-called 104 
ratcheting effect of cumulative culture—latent solutions are more tightly bounded, or 105 
canalized, by each individual’s cognitive and/or motor abilities, which are ultimately 106 
underwritten by genes (and not in the specific sense that a gene “codes for” a particular 107 
behavior or tool). It follows that one would generally expect diachronic change in latent 108 
solutions to come about much more slowly than changes in culturally transmitted traits.  109 
 110 
The “Island Test” (Tomasello 1999) is a useful metaphor for examining to what extent 111 
early stone tools fit the expectations of latent solutions. Imagine a Homo habilis (or 112 
Austalopithecus boisei, for that matter) individual raised alone on an island. This 113 
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individual is never shown how to make an Oldowan flake tool (or any stone tool), nor do 114 
they ever find a discarded tool lying about the island. Now imagine that in the presence 115 
of stone that is easily conchoidally fractured and a fitness mediated goal (say, to cut 116 
through a thick hide that teeth can not penetrate to gain access to a valuable resource, like 117 
animal tissue) this individual, naïve to stone tool production, proves able to produce a 118 
stone implement indistinguishable from a typical Oldowan flake. In this case, we can 119 
reasonably conclude that cultural transmission is not required to make such an 120 
implement. Put differently, in this scenario the kind of flake tool we associate with 121 
Oldowan technology fails the Island Test for cumulative culture, meaning instead that it 122 
is consistent with the expectations of a latent solution rather than a culturally transmitted 123 
technology (Tennie et al. 2016).  124 
 125 
Although an actual “Island Test” is obviously impossible to conduct in this case, we find 126 
that the thought experiment raises important questions. What is the likelihood that an 127 
Earlier Stone Age tool could be fashioned by a (now extinct) hominin individual without 128 
high fidelity cultural transmission? This question in turn forces a consideration of a 129 
possibility infrequently encountered in the Paleolithic archaeological literature. Given all 130 
that has been learned about tool manufacture and use in the animal kingdom since Jane 131 
Goodall’s groundbreaking observations at Gombe (Goodall 1968), we propose that a 132 
more appropriate null hypothesis at this time for the first stone tools is that they were 133 
latent solutions resulting from individual learning augmented by low fidelity social 134 
learning. The question that must then be asked is, what is the data from Oldowan, 135 
Acheulean or even the Middle Stone Age/Middle Paleolithic stone tool assemblages that 136 
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can falsify this hypothesis. In other words, when we set aside the presumption that the 137 
very presence of similar stone tools must mean cumulative culture, we can ask the 138 
question of fundamental interest to human origins - when did cumulative culture begin?  139 
 140 
While difficult, demonstrating rather than presuming high-fidelity cultural transmission 141 
does not strike us as a trivial or hollow task. For one, it will force us to take a closer look 142 
at variation in tools that result from low fidelity social learning as we develop null-based 143 
expectations for the archaeological record. Quantitative analyses of Chimpanzee tools, 144 
such as termite probes and galago spears (Pruetz and Bertolani 2007; Sanz et al. 2009) —145 
possibly examples of latent solutions—could inform us about the level of variation one 146 
would expect to see in Earlier Stone Age tools in the absence of high fidelity cultural 147 
transmission (there are already promising attempts, e.g., Gowlett 2009). Just as 148 
importantly, the task will also force us to dramatically improve our ability to identify 149 
aspects of stone tool production that require the cognitive structure necessary for high 150 
fidelity transmission (Stout et al. 2008; Stout et al. 2009). Currently, we have a 151 
frustratingly limited understanding of what quantifiable components of the lithic 152 
archaeological record are reflective of high fidelity transmission. Any successful 153 
investigations of this question must contend with the time-averaged nature of the 154 
Paleolithic record and further incorporate the necessarily reductive nature of flaked stone 155 
tool technology (e.g., the finished artifact fallacy: Davidson and Noble 1993). Absent 156 
these quantifiable and archaeologically relevant components, attempts to better 157 
understand the cognitive mechanisms responsible for observed variation in stone tools are 158 
unlikely to provide realistic insights into the origins of high fidelity transmission.  159 
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 160 
The time seems right to “reset” the null hypothesis for early lithic technology and cultural 161 
transmission. The picture emerging from both primate studies and Paleolithic 162 
archaeology is one in which simple stone tool technology might not require the cultural 163 
scaffolding or related cognitive hardware modern human flintknappers use. Despite the 164 
fact that great apes seem incapable of the “sophisticated” cognitive skills that underwrite 165 
cultural transmission among living humans, such as imitation, let alone overimitation 166 
(Tennie et al. 2009; but there are also opposing views: Whiten et al. 2009), they exhibit 167 
behaviors that some argue are as complex as those required to manufacture Earlier Stone 168 
Age tools (Haidle 2010; Wynn et al. 2011). But comparing hominin technology from the 169 
last 50,000 years to both Earlier Stone Age technology and to tools chimpanzees make 170 
and use today suggests that something changed in hominins between the Early Stone Age 171 
and the Upper Paleolithic (at the very latest). One might point to increased brain size as 172 
the obvious explanation for such a change in hominin technology, but the toolmaking 173 
abilities of the relatively small-brained Homo f loresiensis (or the beehives of tiny-brained 174 
bees) show that the relationship between brain size and technological sophistication, 175 
including examples of cumulative culture in the case of hominins, is not as simple or 176 
direct as it was once widely thought to be (Morwood et al. 2004). 177 
 178 
A shift in perspective will be productive regardless of where the chips may fall. Finding 179 
evidence for high fidelity cultural transmission in Earlier Stone Age tools would be 180 
evidence for a necessary relationship between the two. On the other hand, finding that 181 
Oldowan, and even Acheulean (and beyond?), stone tool assemblages do not exhibit 182 
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characteristics that require high fidelity cultural transmission would open the door to 183 
important questions concerning when, where, why, and how high fidelity cultural 184 
transmission evolved on our lineage. Maintaining the status quo ensures a tautology: if 185 
we continue to assume a priori that Stone Age stone tools required high fidelity cultural 186 
transmission, then how can we ever arrive at a finding other than that which we assume 187 
from the start? We count ourselves among those (Corbey et al. 2016; Tennie et al. 2016) 188 
who think the best practice in this case is to assume that early stone tools were not 189 
culturally transmitted until demonstrated otherwise. 190 
 191 
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Figure 1: Francis sighed. “Two million years ago,” she thought, “and yet I couldn’t pull 292 
that off today!” (idea by CT - inspired by Gary Larson. With thanks to Tomás Cabanelas 293 
Costas for the drawing) 294 
 295 
